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Abstract: It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between 
competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large 
horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert-identification of relevant rivals and 
the event-study methodology, we find rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at 
the merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events 
is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, ‘future acquisition probability’ does not drive the 
positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a conceptual framework that encompasses the 
impact of merger events on both merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to elicit 
more information on merger type. 
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Management scholarship has extensively studied a number of dimensions to merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity: motives, relatedness, R&D expenditures, top-management turnover, 
acquirer and target stock returns, and more. With regard to the stock returns of acquirers and 
targets, event studies find target firms to capture the majority – if not all – of the benefits from 
M&As (see Andrade et al., 2001; Datta et al., 1992; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Krishnan et al., 
2007; Sirower, 1997; and Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987, for reviews of the extensive literature).
 
Accordingly, the scientific evidence clearly indicates that purchasing the assets of other firms 
does not automatically equate to increasing an acquiring firm’s value: most deals simply pay the 
cost-of-capital (i.e., they break-even) but, more worryingly, many deals actually destroy value. 
The sobering evidence regarding acquirer performance has led to a number of prescriptive 
statements by management scholars suggesting that executives approach this activity with 
extreme caution (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin and Lane, 1996; Sirower, 1997). 
  While the above positive (acquisitions break-even at best and often destroy value) and 
normative (managers should approach mergers with caution) findings regarding acquiring firms 
are well-established, we have very few priors in management on what a merger represents for 
non-merging firms: i.e., the outsiders or rivals to a particular merger. First, the management 
literature has not focused on what merger events mean to firms left outside the merger. 
Chatterjee (1986, 1992) represents the only management scholarship considering the impact of 
acquisitions on rivals; yet, Chatterjee (1986) terms this to be exploratory work and calls for a 
more rigorous conceptual framework to handle the implications of both merging and rival firm 
effects. Second – and related to the above – we lack managerial prescriptions regarding how 
rivals might best react to mergers. Only the field of competitive dynamics seems to treat the 
subject, but in a more general manner: where all competitive actions (price changes, entry/exits,   





product improvements, etc.) are considered alongside mergers for rival reactions (e.g., Chen and 
MacMillan, 1992; D’Aveni, 1994). Moreover, Hoskisson et al. (1999) observe that the 
competitive dynamics literature assumes throughout that reacting strategically is optimal for 
rival firms.  
In the absence of any prescriptive studies regarding optimal strategy when ones 
competitors merge, firms appear to rely upon their competitive instincts by generally considering 
such events to be unwelcome; i.e., they assume hypercompetition is at play. Brito (2003, p. 
1614) states that “real world decisions illustrate that firms react to the announcement of mergers 
in their market, trying to prevent these from happening or trying to become insiders in a number 
of ways”. Akdogu (2003) provides some examples of this dynamic: Chevron Texaco announcing 
intent to bid for Conoco or Phillips to block the merger of the two companies; Norfolk Southern 
launching a hostile bid once it realized that its competitor, CSX, had agreed to a friendly 
acquisition of Conrail; Carnival attempting to dissolve a merger between its competitors (Royal 
Carribean and P&O Princess).
1 Hence, it is popularly perceived that being an outsider to a 
merger represents a competitive threat to non-merging firms (Akdogu, 2003; Brito, 2003; 
Molnar, 2007). Akdogu sums this observation up well when she states that there exists the 
“intuition that losing a target to a competitor is costly” (2003, p. 6).  
  We would like to contend the ‘received wisdom’ that the consummation of a merger 
between two firms represents a competitive threat to non-merging firms, and instead argue that 
rivals are more likely to experience gains when competitors merge. We identify two paths via 
which rival firms may benefit from a competitors’ merger: 1) the more mergers reduce 
competitive rivalry, the more pricing power for all firms – including rivals – in a market; 2) the 
more destructive the merger for insider firms, the more rival firms may actually gain – not lose – 
from the realization of the merger. These two paths can be generalized into two classes of   





mergers (market-power and non-synergistic respectively), though do not represent the full set of 
merger types. Yet, the contention here is that non-merging firms are more likely to experience 
higher profits than lower profits when competitors merge.  
  In order to test our contention, we employ data based on 165 large M&A transactions of a 
horizontal nature that both occurred within the 1990-2002 period and generated competitive 
implications in European product markets. The great advantage in this dataset is that rivals are 
identified by European Commission experts; thus, unlike the pre-existing finance literature (e.g., 
Song and Walkling, 2000; Fee and Thomas, 2004), we do not assume that all other firms in a 
specific industry classification represent rivals. Chatterjee (1992: 273) notes that “SICs are not 
the most reliable in terms of identifying rivals even though they have been used in the past”. 
Accordingly, our expert-assessment of rival identity allows drawing stronger inferences on rival 
effects. In order to elicit the impact of merger events on acquirers, targets and rivals profitability, 
we use the standard event study methodology. Hence, abnormal returns to stock prices around 
merger announcements are deemed to capture changes in the future profit stream of firms. The 
empirical tests support the contention that merger events generally result in positive gains 
(cumulative abnormal returns) to rival firms. Put more cautiously, merger events do not 
generally appear to represent a threat to rival firms. Furthermore, we find the abnormal returns of 
rival firms to be insensitive to the merger wave – suggesting that information effects in the form 
of ‘future acquisition probability’ do not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. 
  We follow up the empirical tests with a discussion concerning the importance of 
considering the impact of mergers on rival firms. Considering rival effects – in combination with 
the management literature’s traditional focus on acquirer and target returns – gives more 
information on the types of mergers being proposed. For instance, the researcher can distinguish 
between market-power and synergistic mergers when rival effects are considered. The reaction   





of rival firms’ stock prices to merger events (in combination with the effects on merging firms’ 
stock prices) yields then critical information on the nature of the proposed transaction. As 
Chatterjee (1992: 269) surmised, “if we simultaneously consider the stock price reactions of the 
rival and [merging firms] then we can uniquely determine the capital market’s expectations 
about the motive behind the original takeover”. Accordingly, by responding to the early call by 
Chatterjee (1986) to build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events 
on both merging and non-merging firms, we generate a schematic for future research that helps 
better distinguish between different merger types. 
  In order to support our twin aims – reverse the ‘received wisdom’ that being left outside a 
merger is necessarily a ‘bad’ thing, and provide a framework to factor the impact of horizontal 
merger events on both merging and rival firms – we structure the remainder of the paper as 
follows. First, we analyze the previous theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
merger events on rival firms and generate our main contention. Second, we consider rival effects 
in the proper wave-like nature of merger events in order to generate the contention that rival 
returns are relatively immune to wave influences. Third, we describe the dataset of large 
horizontal mergers. Fourth, we outline the appropriate methodology. Fifth, we discuss the 
empirical results. Sixth, we present a taxonomy of four merger types based on the varied effects 
of mergers on both merging and non-merging firms that can be used as a schematic by future 
researchers to discern merger types. Finally, we conclude. 
 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON RIVALS 
The extensive M&A literature has largely focused on how merger events affect acquirer 
and target firm performance, but it has paid less heed to the impact of mergers on rival firms. 
Yet, a small and latent cross-disciplinary literature exists that analyzes rival firm effects. Stigler   





(1950) first realized that it might be advantageous for firms to reside outside a merger, as rival 
firms can free-ride on the efforts made by merger insiders to reduce competition in a market: in 
this case, one can think of the merger as a sort of collective good to industry competitors. This 
free-riding effect was also manifest in the influential theoretical work by Salant et al. (1983), and 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) where they respectively find under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition – the two ‘stock’ industrial organization (IO) models – that it is more profitable to 
be an outsider than an insider to a merger in most circumstances. Furthermore, the management 
and IO literatures have identified two merger types that conceivably generate benefits for rivals.   
First, a long-standing rationale behind horizontal mergers is the elimination of 
competitors and facilitation of collusion amongst the remaining firms (e.g., Porter, 1985; Stigler, 
1964). The core dynamic behind these mergers is that the actions by merger insiders to increase 
prices and/or reduce output push up the overall prices in the market. Hence, market-power driven 
transactions are beneficial to merger insiders (acquirers and targets), but also to outsiders (rivals) 
alike – though such mergers come at the expense of suppliers and customers. Here, merging 
firms and rivals are competitive complements: the competition reduction leads to increased 
market power which enhances the future profit expectations of rival firms, and thus generates a 
stock price premium. As an aside, the market-power (or collusive) elements of horizontal 
mergers were considered by many scholars (e.g., Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; 
Seth, 1990) to be a unique source of synergy (along with operational) for related mergers, and 
thus one of the reasons why related mergers should outperform unrelated mergers. Accordingly, 
the collusive or rivalry-reducing nature of market power mergers yields higher profit 
opportunities for rival firms – opportunities that generate positive abnormal returns for rivals. 
Second, it is well understood that targets reap the majority of the stock market gains with 
merger announcements while acquirers usually break-even but often experience value losses;   





moreover, sometimes acquirer losses are so substantial that the net effect on the merging firms 
represents a loss. Here, we highlight the existence of mergers that could be termed non-
synergistic (indicated by a net-negative abnormal return for merging firms). A number of 
explanations for the existence of such mergers have been posited: e.g., empire-building – 
managerial incentives to grow the company at the expense of shareholders (Mueller, 1969; 
Walsh, 1988; Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987); managerial-hubris – managerial expectations are 
systematically upward biased (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Roll, 1986); as well as information 
processing constraints in the Simon (1957) tradition, and internal political games in the Pettigrew 
(1977) tradition.
2 Most importantly, when firms compete as competitive substitutes, non-
synergistic mergers represent a competitive opportunity to non-merging rivals. Here, the 
acquisition does not involve the sufficient joining of resources and capabilities, thus the merged 
firm has no advantage vis-à-vis rival firms. In fact, the internal integration challenges of such a 
merger (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; 
Vaara, 2003) may encumber this firm in strategic competition (managerial time and cognition 
come in limited quantities) to the advantage of rivals. In this vein, Chatterjee (1986, p. 122) 
notes that “the relative wealth gain/loss of the rival firms should be inversely related to that of 
the merging firms”. Accordingly, the value-destroying nature of a non-synergistic merger may 
create competitive opportunities for rival firms – opportunities that generate positive abnormal 
returns for rivals. 
In addition to the formative theoretical work on how rivals might gain from a 
competitor’s merger, a relatively more extensive finance-based literature exists that considers the 
impact of mergers on rivals using event-studies of stock-market returns. Eckbo (1983) first 
considered the impact of merger events on non-merging firms, and found rival shareholders to 
earn above normal returns. Aside from Chatterjee’s (1986, 1992) studies, for a long time Eckbo’s   





approach to consider rival returns was only employed as a secondary method for industry-based 
studies with additional non-stock-based data (e.g., Hosken and Simpson, 2001; Singal, 1996). 
Yet, a spate of recent literature – mostly, but not only, in finance – has re-embraced the approach 
to consider rival effects while taking a pan-industry perspective (Banerjee and Eckard, 1998; 
Duso et al. 2007a, Fee and Thomas, 2004; Molnar, 2007; Shahrur, 2005; Song and Walkling, 
2000). Moreover, the above studies generally support rival firms benefiting from a merger event.  
In sum, both formative theoretical work and existing event studies support the idea that 
non-merging rival firms benefit from competitor mergers. It should be stressed, however, that the 
above represents more of a census than a sample of the literature considering rival firm effects. 
In light of the vast size of the management, finance and industrial organization literature on 
merger performance, the sub-literature on rival firm effects cannot be considered extensive. 
Nevertheless, from the above foundations, we can generate a simple contention concerning large 
horizontal mergers that helps clarify our argument and motivate our empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 1: Non-merging rival firms generally gain when competitor firms engage in 
mergers; i.e., rivals are more likely to gain – than to lose – from merger events. 
 
RIVAL EFFECTS AND MERGER WAVES 
In order to bring some empirical evidence to bear on the relative frequency of different 
merger types, we employ the stock-price event study methodology. In doing so, we would like to 
interpret the stock reactions of rivals (and merging firms) as uniquely reflecting the merger’s 
competitive effects in the product market. Yet, both Eckbo (1983) and Chatterjee (1986) note 
that stock prices impound information effects as well as competitive effects. This early research 
treated information effects vaguely by not identifying what exactly is revealed by a merger 
event; instead, simply positing that mergers signal positive information about an industry’s   





value, and/or potential synergies between rivals and subsequent bidders. Kim and Singal note 
that Eckbo’s information effect has largely been interpreted as signals that “rival firms are now 
more likely to be takeover targets” (1993: 551). Accordingly, more recent scholarship (e.g., 
Molnar, 2007; Song and Walkling, 2000) has concentrated on how mergers can convey whether 
rivals are more or less likely to be targets – a lucrative event for shareholders – in the future.  
Researchers have also recently come to better appreciate Gort’s (1969) observation that 
mergers come in waves, by uncovering the properties of merger waves (e.g., Andrade and 
Stafford, 2004). It stands to reason that a merger’s information effect with respect to ‘future 
acquisition probability’ will be moderated by where on the wave the event takes place. Mergers 
occurring in the pre-crest period (from trough to crest) conceivably indicate a higher probability 
of future acquisition for rivals (i.e., a larger information effect) than do mergers occurring in the 
post-crest period (from crest to trough). This is due to the increased merger activity levels 
associated with the pre-crest period enhancing the probability of rivals being a future target, 
while the lowered merger activity levels characteristic of the post-crest period reduce the 
probability of rivals being a future target. In support of such conjecture, Floegel et al. (2005) 
present evidence that rivals’ pre-crest abnormal returns are positive (0.31%) and post-crest 
abnormal returns are negative (-0.12%) on average; but also find acquirers’ abnormal returns to 
be far more sensitive to the wave (1.55% and -1.11% in the respective pre-crest and post-crest 
periods). Furthermore, other scholars (e.g., Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Song and Walkling, 2000) 
focus on merger announcements that are early in the pre-crest period as involving the greatest 
information effect. Chatterjee (1992: 270) states that when “the rivals can also benefit from [a] 
similar combination then the takeover offer by the first bidder may lead to a merger wave”. 
In order to be confident that the rival returns in our sample are largely driven by 
competitive effects, the empirical results should indeed be robust over the length of the merger   





wave period. In other words, rival returns should be insensitive to any wave-like trends in 
merger behavior. Future acquisition probability, however, has been posited to enhance the 
abnormal returns of rival firms (the information effect of a merger event). Yet, the evidence to 
date suggests that the information effect on rival firm stock prices is relatively moderate: i.e., not 
very sensitive to the merger wave. From the foundations outlined above, we can generate a 
simple contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify our argument and 
motivate our empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 2: Any positive impact of merger-events on rival firms is insensitive to 
merger waves; i.e., the merger wave does not affect the abnormal returns of rival firms. 
 
DATA 
In order to bring some empirical evidence to bear on the general impact of mergers on 
acquirer, target and rival firms, we require a sample of merger events. Our sample derives from 
165 large M&A transactions of a horizontal nature that both occurred within the 1990-2002 
period and affected European product markets. See Appendix A for details on the mergers that 
make up the sample. From these transactions, we were able to identify and obtain the relevant 
usable data for 134 acquirers, 142 targets, and 577 rivals (clearly, many mergers involved 
multiple rivals) for a total of 853 firm-level observations around merger events. Furthermore, 
several firms were involved in more than one merger event (e.g., an acquirer in one merger, but a 
rival in another) as reflected by our having 544 total firms in the sample. Note that we cleaned 
the data of any firms experiencing multiple merger events (as acquirer, target or rival) around the 
same period—i.e., those observations were dropped. Two properties of the sample stand out: it 
consists of large horizontal transactions, and the observed M&As involve significant European   





implications. Both properties owe to these mergers being drawn from those transactions 
automatically analyzed by the European Commission for antitrust implications.
3 
First, European Union (EU) merger regulations mandate notification when the combined 
aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging parties exceeds five billion Euros or when the 
combined aggregate EU-wide turnover of the merging parties exceeds 250 million Euros.
 
Therefore, all of these M&As have undergone a mandatory investigation by the European 
Commission (EC)—an investigation automatically triggered because the merger size exceeded 
the notification thresholds. In short, our sample represents the big horizontal transactions: the 
ones that make business press headlines, incur the interest of pundits and industry analysts, and 
inevitably require at least a cursory review by government officials. 
Second, drawing merger observations from those transactions analyzed by the EC clearly 
leads to European firms being well represented in the sample. Yet Clougherty (2005) noted that 
managers are uncertain over the source (home-nation or foreign-nation) of antitrust holdup for 
domestic mergers. Accordingly, EU antitrust officials vet many different types of mergers with 
firms originating from both EU and non-EU nations. Our sample also reflects this diversity as 
sixty percent of the firms are listed in European nations, twenty-five percent are listed in either 
the US or Canada, and fifteen percent – including 5.5% for Japan – come from the rest of the 
world. In short, our sample is weighted toward European mergers but is also representative of the 
global environment for M&As since many selected mergers involved non-European firms 
making acquisitions that significantly impact world markets. 
The great advantage in drawing our merger database from those transactions analyzed by 
EC officials is that Commission experts have made a careful market definition. The first order of 
business for any antitrust review is defining the merger’s relevant market in terms of product and 
geographical space and identifying the relevant competitors. Hence, the EC files yield an   





accurate assessment of rival identity. The expert-assessment of rival identity is a novelty and a 
particular strength of this merger sample. The pre-existing finance literature on rival effects 
customarily defines rivals as consisting of all firms in the same industry classification. While 
some firms in the same industry will certainly be rivals, other firms are likely to be customers 
and/or suppliers to the merging firms, and still others may have no relation to merging parties. 
To the degree that a rival sample is composed of firms with no-relation to merging firms, 
empirical results would be biased towards finding zero abnormal returns for rivals because such 
firms would be unaffected by the merger. Even more troubling would be considering customer 
firms to be rivals; for example, synergistic mergers should lead to lower profits for rivals but 
higher profits for customers due to lower prices, thus including customer-firms along with rival-
firms would bias the abnormal-return results upward. Inappropriately considering supplier firms 
to be rivals would also bias results. Since sharing the same industry does not equate to being real 
competitors in a product market, the expert assessment of rival-identity allows us to assess the 
effect of mergers on rivals much more precisely than previous work. 
To complement the data from the EC files, we determined the first day each merger case 
appeared in the international press. This announcement date was found by using ‘Dow Jones 
Interactive’: a customizable business news and research product that integrates content from 
newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites. Furthermore, stock market data 
for the period around the announcement date was obtained from ‘Datastream’.  In particular, we 
collected daily data on the stock returns (Ri,t) and market values (MVit) for all merging and rival 
firms; and we collected information about a market return (Rm,t) for each firms’ industry sector 
(where i refers to the firm, m to the specific sector, and t to time). 
 
METHODOLOGY   





We use an event study methodology to measure the impact of mergers on acquirer, target 
and rival firms’ profitability. The observed stock return for a firm at time t ( t i R , ) – which 
represents the discounted future value of the firm at this point in time – is compared to a 
hypothetical counterfactual for the scenario where the merger would not have been announced. 
To calculate the counterfactual, we use the Sharpe-and-Lintner market model: under the 
assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts that firm 
i’s stock return at time t ( t i R , ) is proportional to a market return ( t m R , ): 
t i t m i i t i R R , , , ε β α + + =          
and t i, ε is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term. To study the stock price reaction to a merger 
announcement, we first estimate the ‘normal return’ for each firm by estimating the previous 
equation over a 240-day trading period (ending 60 days prior to the announcement date) using 
the Scholes–Williams (1977) method. We obtain estimated values for the model’s parameters α 
and β, which then predict firm i’s stock price for the counterfactual scenario; i.e., we estimate a 
stock price for the event where the merger would not have been announced ( t i R , ˆ ). We then 
calculate the abnormal return around the mergers’ announcement day t (ARi,t) as follows: 
( ) t m i i it it it t i R R R R AR , , ˆ ˆ ˆ β α + − = − = . 
Since there might be information leakages – which influence firm i’s return before (or after) the 
merger announcement – we define the total firm valuation effect of the merger (the cumulative 
abnormal return or CAR) as being the sum of the daily abnormal returns within an event window 











t i i AR CAR  
We calculate these measures for all merging firms (acquirer and target) and rivals.    





  In our methodological set-up, we were conscious of the recommendations given by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for employing event studies in management research. First, as 
already mentioned, we clean the data of any observations with confounding merger events near 
the event window; plus, the large mergers from this sample likely dwarf the impact of any 
smaller events. Second, it bears stressing that we have a relatively big sample – none of the 29 
management event studies surveyed by McWilliams and Siegel employed more than our 853 
observations – thus the outlier (which we checked for) and robustness-of-significance problems 
are mitigated. Third, we take a conservative approach to ensure that other events are not driving 
abnormal returns by focusing on a short 3-day window (-1, 1), despite it standing to reason that a 
relatively longer window would allow rival effects to be more fully impounded in stock prices. 
For example, both Song and Walkling (2000) and Shahrur (2005) find the CARs of rival firms to 
significantly increase when the event window increases to eleven days (-5, 5). 
  Note that our two main empirical contentions – rivals generally gain from a merger event, 
and this gain is insensitive to the merger wave – do not necessarily attempt to define the source 
of rival gains. Nevertheless, we can use multivariate regression analysis to test these assertions. 
First, we construct simple dummy variables capturing whether a firm is a target (T), acquirer (A) 
or rival (R) respectively; thus, allowing the testing of whether the CARs of the three firm types 
are positive on average and statistically significant. Accordingly, our basic regression equation 
(regression 1) takes the following form: 
i i i i i  R b A b T  b CAR
    ε + + + = 3 2 1       (1) 
where i indexes the 853 firm-level observations, and εi represents an error term. Because targets, 
acquirers and rivals from a given merger all react to the same event, we need to correct for the 
potential intra-merger correlation among observations. We therefore cluster the standard errors at 
the merger level. We also use a Hubert-White estimator for robust standard errors to account for   





potential heteroskedasticity in the error term. Notice that, because we estimate equation (1) 
without a constant term, the b-coefficients represent the average CAR for each firm-type, while 
the error term captures the deviations from these means. 
Second, to test the relevance of the merger wave argument, we construct an individual 
time trend for targets, acquirers and rivals by interacting the three firm-identity variables (T, A & 
R) with a relatively fine trend variable: the number given the merger event by the EC. Beginning 
with merger number 1 in 1990, each subsequent merger notification received a progressively 
increasing identification number (the EC merger numbers for our sample mergers are reported in 
Appendix A). Hence for a given merger, its identification number represents the cumulative 
number of mergers notified until that point in time. This variable should well represent the 
merger wave, as the number of notifications increased more than proportionally over time during 
the sample period reflecting the increased merger activity taking place in the 1990s. Employing 
this trend measure represents an improvement over using an annual trend (where a merger in 
January is considered trend-identical to a merger in December), as it allows a more fine-grained 
representation of the merger wave. Moreover, introducing these individual trend variables allows 
detecting whether the merger wave differently affects the abnormal stock returns of our three 
different firm types; i.e., whether target, acquirer and rival CARs around a merger event are 
significantly, and differently, affected by where the event takes place along the merger wave. 
The second regression (regression 2) that we run is therefore: 
i i i i i i i i  trend R c trend A c trend T c R b A b T  b CAR
        ε + − + − + − + + + = 3 2 1 3 2 1  
Adding the trend variable does, however, make the interpretation of the b-coefficients 
less obvious. They now measure the average effect for that particular firm-type when the trend is 
equal to zero, i.e. the average effect for the very first merger in the wave (e.g. a hypothetical 
merger 0). Yet, the c-coefficients for the firm-type-specific trends (T-trend, A-trend, R-trend) do   





represent the average increase due to time elapsing.  As our sample-period roughly corresponds 
to the entire pre-crest period of a merger wave, a positive and significant trend coefficient would 
indicate that CARs are wave sensitive. Concerning the overall firm-specific average effects, 
these can now be recovered by calculating the sum between the two coefficients evaluated at the 
mean value of the trend (e.g., for the target:  trend T c b − + * 1 1 ).  
The above methods are appropriate for detecting average tendencies in our sample; yet 
without doubt, the cross-national and cross-industry environments for merger activity exhibit a 
significant amount of heterogeneity in merger transactions. Accordingly in additional 
regressions, we break down regression 1 by the geographic and product-space nature of the 
transaction in order to better identify the source of merger tendencies. In particular, we consider 
mergers where the acquirer and target both hail from Europe (Intra-European mergers), where 
the acquirer and target both hail from outside Europe (Extra-European mergers), and where only 
the acquirer or the target hails from Europe and the other merging firm comes from outside 
Europe (Cross-Euro-Border mergers). Furthermore, we have observations on mergers from the 
manufacturing and service industries; hence we also break down merger activity into 
manufacturing-mergers and service-mergers. Accordingly, regressions 3 & 4 respectively 
consider the geographic and product-space heterogeneity in the merger transactions from our 
sample. 
In addition to potential heterogeneity in merger transactions, there might also be rival 
heterogeneity. Winter (1990) questions whether all rivals are the same; hence, we consider here 
the ability of rivals to differ over four dimensions. First, organizational ecologists expect large 
firms to be less vulnerable to competitive pressures, while small firms entail a liability of 
smallness (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Accordingly in regression 5, we break down regression 
1 by the size of the rivals: Large-Rivals representing the top 50% of the size distribution of rivals   





in terms of market value for a given merger, Small-Rivals representing the bottom 50% of the 
same distribution. Second, Baum and Korn (1996) support that the actions of similar size 
competitors represent a greater negative threat to a focal firm than do the actions of competitors 
with a different size (thus a relative size argument as opposed to the previous absolute size 
argument). Accordingly in regression 6, we break down regression 1 by the relative size of the 
rivals with respect to the acquiring firms: Relatively-Small-Rivals representing those rivals that 
have a market-value less than half that of the acquirer; Relatively-Large-Rivals representing 
those rivals that have a market-value greater than 150% of the acquirer; Relatively-Similar-
Rivals representing those rivals of a size in between the above two categories. Third, ecological 
models – as well as strategic and economic models – all hold that more firms in a population 
mean greater competition for scarce resources and thus higher failure rates (Baum and Korn, 
1996). Accordingly in regression 7, we break down regression 1 by the number of rivals for the 
merger transaction: Many-Rivals representing when the merger transaction has more rivals than 
the median number of rivals for our sample (equal to seven rivals); Few-Rivals representing 
when the merger transaction has fewer rivals than the median number of rivals for our sample. 
Fourth, beginning with Zucker (1989) cognitive-based studies of rivalry have explored the role 
of geographic space with local competitors involving more intense rivalry than far-away 
competitors (Boari, et al., 2006). Accordingly in regression 8, we break down regression 1 by 
whether the rivals hail from the same region (Europe, Asia, and North America) as the merging 
firms: Same-Region-Rival representing when the rival comes from the same region as either the 
acquirer or the target; Different-Region-Rival representing when the rival comes from a different 
region to that of both the acquirer and the target. 
 
RESULTS   





Table I reports the results for the first four regression specifications. First off, the results 
from regression 1 are very much in line with the established empirical literature on merging firm 
performance: acquirers have very-small positive CARs on average that are not significantly 
different from zero; and targets have positive and significant CARs of 3.6% on average. Of 
particular interest are the abnormal returns of rival firms. Rivals’ CARs are also positive and 
statistically significant (0.37%); hence, rivals tend to win in our sample. Notice also that rivals 
consistently perform better than acquirers – the order of magnitude of the average CAR is 10 
times larger – but worse than targets. Hence, it is still best to be a target (in line with the 
previous literature), but it is certainly better to be a rival than an acquirer. In short, the results 
indicate that rivals on average experience positive abnormal returns; put more cautiously, by no 
means does a penalty appear to exist for being left outside a merger. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table I about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Regression 2 presents the empirical results from a regression specification that allows the 
abnormal returns for the three different types of firms (target, acquirer and rival) to individually 
vary over the merger wave. Recall that coefficient estimates for the firm-identity variables now 
have a fundamentally different meaning, as they represent the abnormal returns for the first 
merger in the wave. However, the acquirer-trend, target-trend and rival-trend variables provide 
evidence as to whether merger waves impact CARs. We see that the CARs of both rivals and 
acquirers do not appear to be affected by the merger wave: i.e., their abnormal returns do not 
significantly vary over the merger wave. Yet, the abnormal returns of targets vary significantly 
over the merger wave: the CARs of target firms being positively influenced by the merger wave. 
Furthermore, we can recover from the regression specification the average CARs for the three   





types of firms: with rivals exhibiting significant abnormal returns of 0.37% on average; targets 
exhibiting significant abnormal returns of 3.7% on average; and acquirers exhibiting slightly 
positive but insignificant abnormal returns. Accordingly, the empirical results from regression 2 
suggest that the generally positive effects for rivals are not simply driven by the information 
effects of the merger event. In particular, if the rival effects were driven by the merger event 
signaling a higher ‘future acquisition probability’, then rival abnormal returns would be sensitive 
to the merger wave. 
Regression 3 breaks down the three firm types (target, acquirer, and rival) into three 
different geographic contexts under which mergers may fall: Intra-European, Extra-European, 
and Cross-Euro-Border. In terms of the positive abnormal returns to targets detected in the first 
two regressions, this effect seems to be statistically robust across the different geographic 
contexts for mergers: targets in intra-European mergers exhibit significant CARs of 3.0% on 
average; targets in extra-European mergers exhibit significant CARs of 8.1% on average; and 
targets in cross-euro-border mergers exhibit significant CARs of 2.1%. In terms of the non-
significant positive effect found for acquiring firms in the first two regressions, this effect is also 
manifest across the different geographical contexts for mergers. In terms of the positive 
abnormal returns to rivals detected in the first two regressions, this effect is statistically robust in 
two geographic contexts: rivals in Intra-European mergers exhibit significant CARs of 0.34% on 
average; and rivals in Extra-European mergers exhibit significant CARs of 0.81%. However, the 
rivals in cross-euro-border mergers exhibit positive but insignificant CARs on average. 
Accordingly, Intra-European mergers result in positive rival effects, Cross-Euro-Border mergers 
do not significantly affect rivals, and Extra-European mergers generate substantial rival gains.  
Regression 4 breaks down the three firm types (target, acquirer, and rival) into the 
different product contexts under which mergers may fall: manufacturing and service industry   





mergers. In terms of the positive abnormal returns to targets detected in the first two regressions, 
this effect seems to be statistically robust across the different product-market contexts for 
mergers: targets in manufacturing mergers exhibit significant CARs of 3.4% on average; and 
targets in service-industry mergers exhibit significant CARs of 4.0%. In terms of the non-
significant effect found for acquiring firms in regressions’ 1 & 2, this non-effect is also 
consistent across the different product-market contexts for mergers as it is insignificant in both 
sectors. In terms of the positive abnormal returns to rivals detected in the first two regressions, 
this effect is statistically robust in service-industry mergers (where rivals exhibit significant 
abnormal returns of 0.7% on average), and positive in the manufacturing sector at 0.22% on 
average but statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the positive impact of merger events on 
rivals appears to hold for both manufacturing and service industry mergers, but only in the 
service industry does this hold up statistically. 
Table II reports the results for the last four regression specifications: regressions’ 5 
through 8. For brevity, we note that in all four specifications the coefficient estimates for targets 
and acquirers are consistent with those reported in regression 1, and now concentrate on the rival 
heterogeneity effects. Regression 5 suggests no difference between large and small rivals, as 
both coefficient estimates are positive and partially statistically significant (p-values of 0.09 and 
0.11 respectively). Further, an additional t-test of the difference of the two coefficients clearly 
cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the average gains from a merger event for large rivals are 
equal to those of small rivals (p-value 0.770). Regression 6 moves beyond absolute size to 
consider the relative size of rivals with respect to acquiring firms; here, both relatively small 
(0.61% CAR) and relatively similar (0.74% CAR) rivals tend to equally gain when competitors 
engage in mergers. However, rivals that are relatively larger than the acquiring firm tend to have 
a small – but insignificant – positive CAR. This result is somewhat surprising as organizational   





ecologists tend to think that relatively large firms are more immune to threats from the 
competitive environment; yet our evidence suggests that relatively large firms are also more 
immune to the opportunities (like the merger of a competitor) provided in the competitive 
environment. Regression 7 suggests no difference whatsoever between merger events that have 
many or few rivals: a 0.36% average CAR for the many rivals category, and a 0.38% average 
CAR for the few rivals category. Regression 8 suggests that positive and statistically significant 
CARs hold for both when rivals hail – and don’t hail – from the same region as one of the 
merging firms. The Same-Region-Rival category indicates a 0.38% average CAR for rivals, 
while the Different-Region-Rival category indicates a 0.50% average CAR for rivals. Hence, this 
finding – that rivals from other regions gain a bit more than rivals from inside the region of the 
merger – is again somewhat surprising when you consider that organizational ecologists tend to 
think that nearby competitors represent greater threats; yet here, nearby competitors seem to not 
reap the positive effects from a merger event that far-away competitors can reap (though we 
stress, nearby competitors still very much gain from the merger event). 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table II about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
In sum, the eight regression equations provide a good amount of evidence in support of 
rival firms generally benefiting from merger events. Regression 1 suggests that rivals gain on 
average from merger events; these gains are not as large as targets, but they are significantly 
different from zero. Regression 2 suggests that rival CARs are not influenced by the merger 
wave, hence the positive CARs that we detect are not a function of a higher ‘future acquisition 
probability’. Regression 3 finds that rival CARs are positive across the three different 
geographical contexts for merger activity, though insignificant for Cross-Euro-Border mergers.   





Regression 4 finds that rivals CARs are positive for manufacturing and service industries, though 
the positive effect is insignificant for manufacturing industries. Furthermore, regression 5 
through 8 also support that rivals generally benefit from merger events, as the positive CAR for 
rival firms appears to hold up when we consider absolute size differences in rivals (regression 5), 
relative size differences in rivals (regression 6), the scope for competition in the environment 
(regression 7), and the geographic spacing of rivals (regression 8). It should be stressed that in 
none of the heterogeneous contexts for mergers and rivals (regression 3 – 8) do we find rival 
effects to be negative on average. Yet, the lack of significance for positive rival effects in 
manufacturing and Cross-Euro-Border mergers suggests that we temper our interpretations and 
state that the evidence weakly supports that rival firms generally gain from merger events. 
Moreover, our evidence certainly strongly rejects the notion that merger events generally 
represent a threat to non-merging rival firms.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF RIVAL EFFECTS ON MERGER TYPES 
The consideration of rival effects yields implications beyond the fact that non-merging 
rival firms generally do not suffer from the completion of a merger by competitors, as the impact 
of a merger event on rivals provides salient information on the nature of the proposed 
transaction. Recall the two types of mergers – market-power and non-synergistic – that were 
considered to be beneficial for rival firms; the impact of a merger event on the stock prices of 
rival and merging firms allows differentiating between these two merger types. Mergers that 
generate net-positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) and a positive 
abnormal return to a rival firm can be considered market-power enhancing mergers. While 
mergers that generate a net-negative abnormal return to merging firms (acquirers and targets) 
and a positive abnormal return to a rival firm can be considered non-synergistic mergers. Notice   





that we consider the abnormal returns of merging firms (the acquirer plus the target) in order to 
side-step the whole issue as to which of these two firms captures the majority of the transaction 
value (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Barney, 1988; Sirower, 1997).  
Yet as already noted, market-power and non-synergistic mergers (where rivals gain) do 
not represent the full set of potential merger types when one considers the varied effects possible 
on both rival and merging firms. In particular, there are indeed mergers that will result in rivals 
experiencing negative abnormal returns. Our empirical analysis above suggests that these merger 
types are less likely to occur, but they certainly do exist. Namely, synergistic (where merging 
firms gain but rivals lose) and preemptive (where both merging firms and rivals lose) also 
represent potential merger event outcomes. 
First, the most widely cited rationale behind horizontal mergers is the search for 
synergies (Walter and Barney, 1990). While the concept of synergy is used in different ways by 
different scholars, we employ the Hitt et al. (2001: 58) definition where the “creation of synergy 
– results in a competitive advantage for the firm” and is pursued via scale and scope economies 
as well as skill and resource sharing; hence, collusive (i.e., market-power) is not a synergy in this 
analysis. Accordingly, mergers that reduce costs for merging firms by any metric – scope, scale, 
or buyer-power – are synergistic mergers. Based on the work conceptualizing industries as being 
characterized by a degree of resource heterogeneity and immobility (Barney, 1991), management 
research has moved beyond a focus on cost-based synergies to embrace a richer consideration of 
merger synergies with acquisitions representing a means to purchase resources that could not 
otherwise be accessed (Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). More 
specifically, acquisitions provide bidders with new products, assets, and skills which may be 
used to serve both new and pre-existing customers. For instance, Capron (1999) considers how 
resource redeployment post-acquisition can enhance merger performance. In this vein, Hitt et al.   





argue that the joining of resources that are different but mutually supportive is critical to 
achieving synergy: “complementary resources between an acquiring and acquired firm can create 
synergies that, in turn, generate a competitive advantage for the firm over its competitors” (2001: 
82). As they allude to, the fundamental difference between synergistic mergers and market-
power mergers is that merging firms and rivals indicate inversely related profit-effects. Here, 
merging firms and rivals are competitive substitutes: the acquisition involves the joining of 
resources and capabilities that gives merging firms an advantage vis-à-vis rivals, thus the merger 
represents a competitive threat to non-merging rivals. Accordingly, mergers that generate net-
positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) and a negative abnormal 
return to a rival firm can be considered synergistic mergers. 
Second, some non-synergistic mergers actually generate competitive losses for both 
merging and non-merging rival firms. In this class of mergers, the merging firms and rivals can 
be considered competitive complements; i.e., the merger is value-destroying for both parties. 
Such ‘destructive’ mergers were traditionally difficult to explain; though, recent research on the 
nature of preemptive mergers (e.g., Akdogu, 2003; Brito, 2003; Molnar, 2007) helps shed light 
on the dynamics behind some of these mergers. Essentially, if losing a target to a competitor 
means you would experience a substantial competitive loss, then it may make sense to over-bid 
and receive a negative return: i.e., acquiring firm losses are not as large as they would have been 
had they been an outsider to the merger. These preemptive mergers provide a logic as to why 
rational shareholder-valuing managers might pursue value-decreasing mergers. Furthermore, 
Molnar (2007) notes that when submitting a bid reveals negative news about an industry (e.g., 
the presence of cost or demand shocks), preemption results in a decreased aggregate value for 
the merging firms. It should be pointed out that many mergers here (those where the acquiring 
firms experience larger losses than the rival firms) do not conform to the preemption hypothesis;   





instead, these mergers must simply be considered value-destroying. Nevertheless, mergers that 
generate net-negative abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) and a negative 
abnormal return to a rival firm will be labeled as preemptive mergers even though that does not 
cover all the transaction types embedded in this category.  
The merger types – market-power, synergistic, non-synergistic, and preemptive – can be 
represented in a simple taxonomy: Table III illustrates that taxonomy of four merger types with 
respect to their varied effects on merging and rival firms.
4 Most importantly, variation in the 
stock-market reaction to merger events by both merging firms and rivals provides an indication 
of the true nature of the proposed transaction. It bears stating, that specific mergers will 
potentially involve elements of different merger types: e.g., many mergers involve both 
synergies and market-power elements (Kim and Singal, 1993). Yet, the sign of the abnormal 
return indicates which element dominates (the net effect): for example, a merger where the 
merging-firms elicit a positive CAR may involve some market-power elements, but if rivals 
elicit a negative CAR then the synergistic elements dominate the market-power elements of the 
merger. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table III about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Accordingly, we begin here to address Chatterjee’s (1986) call for a more rigorous 
conceptual framework that embraces the full implications of merger events: i.e., the impact on 
both merging firms and non-merging rival firms. Moreover, the different competitive effects of 
M&A transactions on merging firms and rivals drives the identification of the different merger 
types (market-power, synergistic, non-synergistic and preemptive) in our conceptual framework. 
In particular, rival effects help us differentiate between market-power mergers (where the motive   





is generally softer rivalry in a market) and synergistic mergers (where the motive is generally 
competitive in nature). In addition, rival effects help us differentiate between non-synergistic 
mergers (where the motive is often hubris or empire-building in nature) and preemptive mergers 
(where the motive is rational and shareholder-valuing). Without considering rival effects, we 
simply could not make these distinctions. 
The above point regarding the importance of rival effects in differentiating between 
merger types can be born out when we consider the traditional management literature on M&As. 
That literature generally focuses on the impact of a merger event on merging firms (i.e., the 
acquirer and target) and neglects the impact of the event on rival firms – Chatterjee (1986, 1992) 
represent the exceptions. Hence, synergistic mergers are simply those mergers that lead to a net 
positive gain in the stock prices of merging firms (Michel and Shaked, 1985; Weidenbaum and 
Vogt, 1987). Yet as already noted, this approach does not allow us to tease apart market-power 
mergers from synergistic mergers: both types positively impact the stock price of merging firms, 
but only synergistic mergers negatively influence the stock price of rival firms. Consider, for 
instance, how the managerial challenges involved with these two types of mergers are quite 
different: market-power mergers simply require the killing off of a competitor and the 
subsequent reaping of gains from reduced rivalry, while synergistic mergers require 
sophisticated integration of resource bundles a la Barney (1986) and Capron (1999) – integration 
so successful that rival firms find themselves at a disadvantage with regard to the merged entity. 
Accordingly, by defining merger types in this fashion we gain insight on the potential primary 
motivation behind the merger, and we gain insight on the managerial challenges involved with 
the transaction.  
Furthermore, mergers resulting in a negative abnormal stock return for merging firms are 
often considered failures on the part of management due to empire-building, managerial-hubris   





or information-processing problems (Lubatkin, 1983). Hence, mergers that generate a negative 
CAR for merging firms have traditionally been lumped into the non-synergistic merger category 
and considered the result of managerial failure. Yet preemptive mergers are fundamentally 
different from non-synergistic mergers. Preemptive mergers actually do involve shareholder 
valuing management, but in this case management must allow the stock price of the firm to fall 
in order to protect shareholders from what would be a greater loss. Taking rival effects into 
account also allows differentiating between these two fundamentally different merger types. 
The significance of being able to differentiate between market-power and synergistic 
mergers, and between non-synergistic and preemptive mergers can also be manifested by 
grafting our data on large horizontal merger transactions on to the proposed conceptual 
framework. Using our 3-day CARs for merger events, we classify mergers – according to their 
effect on rivals and merging firms – into the four merger types illustrated in Table III. For the 
current tests, each observation represents a pairing between a rival and the merging parties. 
Furthermore, we create the abnormal return for the combined merged entity by taking the 
weighted average of the merging firms’ CARs using their market value as a weight. We also 
enlarge the proposed taxonomy to include an extra category labeled ‘no effect’: cases where the 
estimated abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero (CARs within two standard 
errors of zero are termed ‘no-effect’).  
Using the above procedures allows building tables that illustrate the importance of 
factoring the rival effects from a merger event. First, Table IV presents the merger taxonomy 
based on the Intra-European sub-sample of mergers; hence, it includes all mergers in which both 
the acquirer and target hail from a European nation. Reflecting the importance of the proposed 
conceptual framework, Table IV illustrates the non-negligible presence of all kinds of mergers in 
the sample: i.e., market-power (21.83% of the sample), synergistic (16.22% of the sample), non-  





synergistic (15.34%) and preemptive (15.63%) all exist. Note that market-power and non-
synergistic mergers (where rivals gain) are more frequent events than synergistic and preemptive 
mergers (where rivals lose): 37.17% versus 31.85% of the sample. Furthermore, 43.07% of the 
rival observations experience a significant positive CAR, whereas 41.59% experience a 
significant negative CAR. Another way to interpret the results is to note that in 58.41% of the 
cases, rivals do not experience a significant loss from the event. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table IV about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Moreover, we would like to compare this sample of Intra-European mergers with 
another sample of mergers in order to illustrate the relevance of considering rival effects. 
Table V then presents the merger taxonomy based on a sub-sample where either the acquirer 
or the target firm hails from the UK; hence, this sub-sample includes both intra-UK mergers 
and mergers where the UK firm is either the buyer or target of a foreign firm. The two sub-
samples will have some overlap in that observations where the UK firm is either the buyer or 
target of another European firm will be in both samples, yet this is not crucial as the tables are 
generated for illustrative purposes. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table V about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Notice that the Intra-European and UK samples yield very similar results with regard to 
how often merging firms’ experience a significant positive CAR: 43.95% for the European 
sample, and 42.86% for the UK sample. If we were to have no additional information on rival 
observations – akin to the traditional approach in the management M&A literature – then we   





would argue that the transactions in these two samples were equal in terms of synergistic 
tendencies. Yet factoring the impact of these merger events on rival observations tells us quite a 
bit more. We see that market-power mergers represent 21.83% of the European sample, but only 
13.39% of the UK sample; further, synergistic mergers represent 16.22% of the European 
sample, and 16.07% of the UK sample. In short, the UK mergers appear to be relatively more 
synergistic than the European mergers; i.e., the UK mergers are likely to be less motivated by 
market-power rationales and to involve more substantial managerial challenges.  
Comparing the UK and European samples for the non-synergistic/preemptive distinction 
in merger types also proves to be illustrative. First, 36.58% of the merging firms for the 
European mergers experience a significant negative CAR, whereas only 30.36% of the merging 
firms for UK mergers experience a significant negative CAR. We also see that non-synergistic 
mergers represent 15.34% of the EU sample, but only 8.04% of the UK sample; further, 
preemptive mergers represent 15.63% of the European sample, and 11.61% of the UK sample. 
This again yields evidence that the UK mergers appear to be more shareholder valuing than the 
European mergers. In fact, our results corroborate Ingham, Kran and Lovestam’s (1992) survey 
in JMS that found UK mergers to substantially involve value-maximizing motivations. 
 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Motivated by the scarcity of management research on what it means to be a non-merging 
rival firm left outside a merger of competitors, this paper consists of three main endeavors. First, 
employing a sample of large horizontal M&A transactions with expert assessment of rival 
identity and the stock-price event study methodology, we present empirical evidence in support 
of our contention that rivals generally gain when competitors engage in merger activity. Thus, 
akin to the well-documented normative prescriptions concerning the inadvisability of   





automatically engaging in acquisition behavior, it is also inadvisable to automatically assume 
that a competitor’s merger imperils rival firms. Second, we ensure that these positive rival-
effects are not simply driven by the information effects embedded in merger waves; i.e., ‘future 
acquisition probability’ does not fundamentally determine the abnormal returns of rivals. More 
precisely, we find the positive abnormal returns of rivals to not be sensitive to the merger wave. 
Third, we build a conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both 
merging and rival firms’ abnormal returns in order to yield a schematic that elicits more 
information on merger type. In particular, by analyzing rival firm effects – in combination with 
the traditional focus on merging firm effects – we can differentiate between synergistic and 
market-power mergers, and between non-synergistic and preemptive mergers. 
This research, nevertheless, involves a number of limitations that should be 
acknowledged – limitations that also point to future research avenues. First, the most obvious 
area for additional research resides in the realm of further empirical testing on different M&A 
samples. While our sample is particularly strong regarding the accuracy of rival-identity, it is 
also characterized by large horizontal transactions. Hence, samples that involve relatively 
smaller horizontal mergers may involve different properties. Further, the exploratory tests 
considering heterogeneity in the rival context yielded some interesting findings that seem 
counter-intuitive to organizational ecology insights: both absolutely and relatively large firms 
appear to do no better (and sometimes worse) than small firms in reaping the benefits of a 
competitor’s merger; the number of competitors in the environment does not appear to affect 
rival returns; and nearby firms appear to – if anything – reap fewer benefits than far-away firms. 
These empirical irregularities should be further studied; and if held up, they suggest that the 
qualities which make firms resilient to competitive pressures in an environment also reduce the 
organization’s ability to reap beneficial opportunities in the same environment.   





Second, Boari et al. (2006) note that studies of rivalry tend to consist of two separate 
approaches: a rational-economic model, or a cognitive managerial model. While we have made 
some exploratory tests with regard to how rival size, rival location, and competition (i.e., 
population density) affect our results, there is no doubt that our analysis can largely be 
characterized as falling in the rational-economic approach. To the degree then that managers 
continue to indicate non-rational behavior when competitor firms engage in mergers, research 
concerning the cognitive concepts of managerial perceptions could be quite valuable. For 
instance, Vaara (2003) considers post-acquisition integration from a sensemaking perspective 
with the attendant analysis of integration processes and decision-making. Such research clearly 
calls for a more case-based approach – with fine-grained data on managerial perceptions – than 
that employed here.  
Third, while we have taken some initial steps to consider the conditions under which 
non-merging rival firms are more likely to gain from a merger of competitors (i.e., Intra-
European, Extra-European, and service-industry mergers; and similarly-sized, small-sized, 
nearby, and far-away rivals), the question of what drives the abnormal returns of rival firms is 
one that could be more fully addressed. For instance, Oxley et al. (2007) examine the 
determinants of rival firm abnormal returns when competitor firms announce strategic alliances; 
in particular, they find non-horizontal and cross-border alliances to negatively affect the 
abnormal returns of rivals. Further research in this vein regarding M&A activity is certainly 
merited. 
In addition to the future research avenues opened up by the limitations of this study, we 
also hope to spur future research that would employ our proposed schematic for identifying 
merger types. One of the chief challenges in management research on M&As has been the 
inability to hold constant the different motives and competitive effects behind merger activity.   





For instance, Chatterjee (1986) excluded horizontal mergers from his study in order to side-step 
the issue of collusive synergy and focus more on operational synergy. Our method provides a 
means to differentiate and classify different horizontal mergers by their effect on the stock prices 
of merging and rival firms. Accordingly, the ability to identify merger type can be of practical 
use in future management studies of M&A activity. In short, we in the management literature 
have neglected Chatterjee’s early call to consider rival effects for far too long.   







1 Akdogu (2003) describes another interesting case of firms desiring to not be left outside a 
merger: Northwest Airline’s marketing agreement with Continental Airlines gives Northwest 
veto power over any possible acquisitions of Continental (the recently proposed acquisition of 
Northwest by Delta negates this provision, and many pundits note that this suggests that 
Continental will now be in play as a target). See Brito (2003) and Molnar (2007) for many more 
examples of firms taking action to prevent competitors from merging. 
2 See Parvinen and Tikkanen (2007) for a theoretical initiative that encompasses many of these 
merger-failure-explanations under the rubric of ‘incentive asymmetries’. 
3 Merger specific information is derived from the EC files that are freely downloadable from its 
webpage. Our sample includes almost all mergers during the 1990-2002 period that went through 
an in-depth antitrust investigation (the so-called phase II) by the EC, plus, the sample includes a 
randomly matched selection of less problematic (phase I) mergers. 
4 For examples of somewhat similar merger taxonomies, see Gugler et al. (2003) and Duso et al. 
(2007b). 
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Regression Results with CAR as Dependent Variable 
 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Base  Time-Trend  Merger-Type  Merger-
Industry 
Target 0.0361  ***  -0.0053             
   (0.0099)    (0.0109)            
Acquirer 0.0006    0.0000             
   (0.0063)    (0.0060)            
Rival 0.0037  **  0.0007             
   (0.0037)    (0.0025)            
Target-Trend     0.0323  **           
       (0.0126)            
Acquirer-Trend     0.0005             
       (0.0057)            
Rival-Trend     0.0021             
       (0.0018)            
Target Intra-European          0.0296  ***      
           (0.0110)        
Target Extra-European          0.0807  ***      
           (0.0289)        
Target Cross-Euro-Border          0.0213  **      
           (0.0107)        
Acquirer Intra-European          0.0051        
           (0.0074)        
Acquirer Extra-European          -0.0146        
           (0.0110)        
Acquirer Cross-Euro-Border          0.0013        
           (0.0062)        
Rival Intra-European          0.0034  *      
           (0.0019)        
Rival Extra-European          0.0081  **      
           (0.0037)        
Rival Cross-Euro-Border          0.0006        
           (0.0045)        
Target Manufacturing              0.0344  *** 
               (0.0105)    
Target Service              0.0397  ** 
               (0.0157)    
Acquirer Manufacturing              -0.0002    
               (0.0069)    
Acquirer Service              0.0021    
               (0.0057)    
Rival Manufacturing              0.0022    
               (0.0020)    
Rival Service              0.0071  *** 
                     (0.0026)    
Average Effect Target      0.0369  ***          
Average Effect Acquirer      0.0006            
Average Effect Rival        0.0037  **             
N 853  853  853  853 
R-squared 0.0656  0.0994  0.0882  0.0669 
The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR. Hubert-White robust standard errors clustered by merger in 
parentheses. The symbols * ** , and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 
   






Additional Regression Results with CAR as Dependent Variable 
 
  Model  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   Size  Relative Size  Competition  Geographic 
Region 
Target  0.0361 *** 0.0347 *** 0.0361 *** 0.0361 *** 
    (0.0087)   (0.0092)   (0.0087)   (0.0087)     
Acquirer  0.0006   0.0006   0.0006   0.0006     
    (0.0049)   (0.0049)   (0.0049)   (0.0049)     
Large-Rivals  0.0032  *            
    (0.0020)              
Small-Rivals  0.0042              
    (0.0026)              
Relatively-Small-Rivals     0.0061  **         
        (0.0027)           
Relatively-Similar-Rivals     0.0074  *         
        (0.0041)           
Relatively-Large-Rivals      0.0011           
        (0.0021)           
Many-Rivals         0.0036        
           (0.0023)        
Few-Rivals        0.0038  *      
           (0.0022)        
Same-Region-Rivals            0.0038  * 
              (0.0020)     
Different-Region-Rivals            0.0050  * 
                     (0.0026)    
N 853  722
a 853 853 
R-squared  0.0656 0.0636 0.0656 0.0662 
The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR. Hubert-white robust standard errors clustered by merger in 
parentheses. The symbols *, ** , and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
a The number of observations drops due to the need to match rivals with the corresponding acquiring firm 
data. 
   


























   







Merger Taxonomy for Intra-European Mergers 
 


























33 (9.73%)  53 (15.63%) 
Preemptive 
141 (41.59%) 
Total  149 (43.95%)  66 (19.47%)  124 (36.58%)  339 
 
We measure profitability by means of the 3-day CAR window. The first number in each cell reflects merger type 
observations, while the number in ‘ ( ) ‘ refers to what percentage of all observations the cell represents. 
   







Merger Taxonomy for UK Mergers 
 


























13 (11.61%)  13 (11.61%) 
Preemptive 
44 (39.29%) 
Total  48 (42.86%)  30 (26.79%)  34 (30.36%)  112 
 
We measure profitability by means of the 3-day CAR window. The first number in each cell reflects merger type 




   






Description of Sample Mergers 
 
Notif.  Merger No.   Acquirer  Target  Actual  No. of   Industry  Merger Type 
Year  (Trend)        No. of 
Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data       
1990 4  Renault  Volvo  4  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1990 12  Varta  Bosch  3  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1990  24  Mitsubishi Corp.  Union Carbide Corp.  2  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1990 42  Alcatel  Fiat  2  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1990 43  Fiat  Alcatel  1  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1990 50  At&T  Ncr  Corporation  5  4  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1991 53  Boeing  Alenia  3  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1991  57  Digital Equipment Int.  Mannesmann  2  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1991 68  Tetrapak  1  Alfa-Laval  2  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1991 81  Viag  Continental  Can  9  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1991  121  Ingersoll Rand Co.  Dresser Inc.  5  3  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1991 126  Accor  Wagons-Lits  6  3  Service  Intra-European 
1991  129  Digital Equipment Corp.  Philips Electronics 7  6  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1991 141  Uap  Transatlantic  HDG. 2  2 Service  Intra-European 
1991  165  Alcatel Cable S.A.  Aeg Kabel  4  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1992 184  Gran  Metropolitan  Cinzano S.A.  1  1  Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 190  Nestle'  Eaux  Vittel  2  1  Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992  214  Du Pont  Imperial Chemical Ind. 3  3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1992  221  Asea Brown Boveri   Trafalgar Hse  6  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1992 222  Mannesmann  Hoesch  1  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1992 236  Ericsson  Ascom  6  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1992 253  Btr  Pirelli  5  2  Manufacturing Intra-European 
1993 269  Shell  Montedison  14  7  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1993  286  Zuerich Insurance   Municipal Mutual Ins.  3  2  Service  Intra-European 
1993  291  Knp   Buehrmann Tetterode  2  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1993  315  Mannesmann  Vlourec  Dalmine  3  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1993 331  Fletcher  Challenge  Methanex  6  3  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1993 354  Cyanamid  Shell  6  5  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1993  358  Pilkington  Societa' Italiana Vetro 4  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994  430  Procter & Gamble  Vp Schickedanz  4  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1994  437  Matra Marconi Space   British Aerospace   16  6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994  447  Schneider Electric S.A.  AEG A.G.  6  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994 466  Tractebel  Synatom  1  0  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994 468  Siemens  Italtel  5  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994 469  Bertelsmann  Deutsche  Bundespost 2  1  Service  Intra-European 
1994 477  Daimler  Benz  Kässbohrer  6  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994 479  Man  Ingersoll  Rand  4  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994  484  Thyssen Stahl  Acciai Speciali Asti   5  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1994 498  Commercial  Union  Suez  5  3  Service  Intra-European 
1994 508  CCF  BHF  12  7  Service  Intra-European 
1995  550  Union Carbide   Enichem S.P.A.  14  8  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1995 582  Orkla  As  Volvo  4  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1995  603  Crown Cork & Seal   Carnaudmetalbox Sa 4  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1995 619  Gencor  Lonmin  2  1  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1995 623  Kimberly-Clark  Scott  Paper  6  2  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1995  632  Rhône Poulenc Rorer   Fisons Plc.)  12  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1996 685  Siemens  Lagardere  7  6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1996 689  Singapore  Telecom  Belgacom  4  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 706  Alcatel  Aeg  5  3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1996  731  Kvaerner A.S.  Trafalgar House Plc  3  1  Service  Intra-European 
1996 737  Ciba-Geigy  Sandoz  26  12  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1996  754  Anglo American Corp.  Lonmin  2  1  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border   





Year  Merger No.   Acquirer  Target  Actual  No. of   Industry  Merger Type 
Notif.  (Trend)        No. of 
Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data       
1996  774  Saint Gobain  Hoechst Wacker  2  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1996  794  Coca-Cola Enterprises  Cadbury Schweppes 5 2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1996  798  General Electric  Compunet Computer  5  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 818  Cardo  Thyssen  6  6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997  833  Coca Cola Company  Carslberg A/S  2  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 850  Fortis  Abn-Amro  Bank  2  2  Service  Intra-European 
1997  856  British Telecom  Mci (Ii)  5  4  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 877  Boeing  Mcdonnell  Douglas  1  1  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1997 913  Siemens  Elektrowatt  12  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997 938  Guinness  Grand  Metropolitan  4  3 Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997 942  Veba  Degusta  15  7  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997  950  Roche  Boehringer Mannheim   5  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997  954  Bain Capital Inc.  Hoechst Ag  8  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1997 967  Klm  Air  UK  2  1  Service  Intra-European 
1997  970  Thyssen Krupp Stahl  Itw Signode  12  2  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1997  986  Bayer Group  Du Pont I De  Nemours 5  3 Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1997  993  Bertelsmann  Taurus Entertainment   1  1  Service  Intra-European 
1997 1027  Deutsche  Telekom  Bertelsmann 1  1  Service  Intra-European 
1997  1042  Eastman Kodak   Dainippon Ink   3  3  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1997 1069  Worldcom  Mci  2  2  Service Extra-European 
1997  1081  Dow Jones  General Electric  1  0  Service  Extra-European 
1997 1094  Caterpillar  Lucas  Varity  7  7  Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1998  1142  Commercial Union Plc  General Accident Plc  8  4  Service  Intra-European 
1998 1221  Rewe  Meinl  4  1  Service Intra-European 
1998  1225  Enso Oyj  Stora   6  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1998 1232  Ingram  Tech  Data  4  2  Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1998 1252  At&T  TCI  4  3  Service Extra-European 
1998 1258  General  Electric  Finmeccanica  3 2 Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1998  1265  Chs Electronics Inc.  Metro Ag  4  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1998  1332  Thomson-CSF  Lucas Varity Plc  4  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1363  Du Pont De Nemours   Hoechst AG  4  4  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1999  1383  Exxon Corporation  Mobil Corporation  34  11  Service  Extra-European 
1999 1403  Astra  Zeneca  13 6  Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999  1405  Tnt Post Group N.V.  Jet Services Sa  7  2  Service  Intra-European 
1999 1439  Telia  AB  Telenor  6  2  Service Intra-European 
1999 1476  Adecco  S.A.  Delphi  2 2 Service  Intra-European 
1999 1484  ALSTOM  ABB    13 6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999 1524  Airtours  First  Choice  6  1  Service Intra-European 
1999  1532  Bp Amoco Plc.  Atlantic Richfield   11  5  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1999  1539  CVC European Equity II  Groupe DANONE   6  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1551  AT&T Corp.  MediaOne Group  1  1  Service  Extra-European 
1999  1561  Getronics N.V.  Wang Laboratories   3  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1578  Sanitec  Konink.  Sphinx  27 3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1596  ACCOR  S.A.  The BLACKSTONE   4  2  Service  Intra-European 
1999  1628  Total Fina  Elf Aquitaine  15  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1630  L'Air Liquide S.A.  The BOC Group plc.  7  3  Service  Intra-European 
1999  1636  Matra Marconi Space  Astrium  15  4 Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1641  Linde AG  AGA AB  5  5  Service  Intra-European 
1999 1650  ACEA  S.P.A.  Telefonica  1  1  Service Intra-European 
1999  1663  Alcan Aluminium Ltd.  Alusuisse - Lonza    13  4  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
1999  1671  Dow Chemical  Union Carbide  12  5  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1999  1672  Ab Volvo  Scania Ab  5  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
1999  1673  Veba Ag  Viag Ag  16  9  Service  Intra-European 
1999 1682  Ashland  Superfos  1  4  Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1687  Adecco  SA  Olsten  3  3  Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1999  1693  Alcoa Inc.  Reynolds Metals   18  5  Manufacturing  Extra-European   





Year  Merger No.   Acquirer  Target  Actual  No. of   Industry  Merger Type 
Notif.  (Trend)        No. of 
Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data       
1999 1694  Emc  Data  General  4  1  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
1999 1741  MCI  WorldCom  Sprint  25  12  Service Extra-European 
1999  1789  INA Holding   LuK Group  11  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  1797  Bae Systems+ Investor   Celsius AB  12  3  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  1806  Novartis AG  AstraZeneca Plc.  18 6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000 1813  Industri Kapital 
(Nordkem)  Dyno 18  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000 1845  AOL  Time  Warner  13 5  Service Extra-European 
2000  1853  Electricite De France  EnBW  8  4  Service  Intra-European 
2000  1879  The Boeing Company  Hughes Electronics   13  2  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
2000  1882  Pirelli Cavi e Sistemi   BICC General 24  6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  1892  Sara Lee  Courtaulds Textiles   1 3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
2000  1915  The Post Office  TPG  11  1  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 1940  Framatome  Siemens  24 7  Service Intra-European 
2000  1956  Ford Motor Company  Autonova AB  4  5  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
2000  1982  Telia AB  Oracle Corporation  3  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
2000  1990  Unilever PLC   Bestfood  29  5  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 2020  Metsä-Serla  Corporation  Modo  9  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  2033  Svedala Industri AB  Metso Corporation  1  1  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  2041  United Airlines   US Airways Group Inc.  4  3  Service  Extra-European 
2000  2050  Vivendi S.A.  Canal+ S.A.  4  4  Service  Intra-European 
2000 2059  Siemens  AG  Dematic  22  10  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  2060  Robert Bosch GmbH  Mannesmann Rexroth 11  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000  2097  SCA Mölnlycke Holding   Metsä Tissue Corp.  7  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2000 2139  Bombardier  Adtranz  11 3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
2001 2201  Man  Auwaerter  5  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2202  Stinnes AG (E.ON AG)  Holland Chemical  5  2  Service  Intra-European 
2001  2220  General Electric Corp.  Honeywell     22  13  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
2001 2283  Schneider  Legrand  4  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2302  H.J. Heinz Company  CSM NV  14  3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border 
2001  2333  Riverbank  Sofidiv UK Ltd.  3  1  Service  Intra-European 
2001  2389  Deutsche Shell GmbH  RWE AG  16  7  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2396  Industri Kapital 
(Nordkem)  Perstorp 14  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2416  Tetra Laval, S.A.  Sidel, S.A.  14  5  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2420  Mitsui  CVRD  3  3  Service Extra-European 
2001 2421  UMG-Beteiligungs-
GmbH  Temic Telefunken   15  11  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2447  Fabricom  GTI  3  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2485  Verbund  Estag  9  2  Service Intra-European 
2001 2498  UPM-Kymmene  Haindl  17 4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2499  Norske  Skog  Parenco  17 4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2504  Cadbury  Schweppes    Pernod  9 6  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001 2510  Cendant  Corporation Galileo  International  2  2 Service  Extra-European 
2001  2513  RWE  Kaertner Energie   4  3  Service  Intra-European 
2001 2530  Südzucker  Saint  Louis  5  2  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2533  British Petrol plc (BP)  Veba Oil GmbH 17  8  Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001  2577  GE Capital Corporation  Heller Financial, Inc  11  7  Service  Extra-European 
2001 2598  TDC Mobile 
International   CMG   5  5  Service  Intra-European 
2001 2602  Gerling-Konzern    NCM  6  3  Service Intra-European 
2001  2608  INA Holding Schaeffler   FAG   5  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2001  2629  Flextronics International  Xerox Corporation 5  4  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
2001  2659  Fortum Oyj  Birka Energi AB  10  4  Service  Intra-European 
2001  2679  Electricité de France  TXU EUROPE  3  2  Service  Cross-Euro-Border 
2002 2693  ADM  Alfred  C.  1  1  Service Cross-Euro-Border 
2002 2705  EnerSys  Energy  Storage  5  3  Manufacturing  Cross-Euro-Border   
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2002  2726  Koninklijke KPN N.V.  E-Plus 3  2  Service  Intra-European 
2002 2738  General Electric 
Company  Unison Industries Inc.  7  3  Manufacturing  Extra-European 
2002  2796  Siemens AG  Aerolas GmbH  5  4  Manufacturing  Intra-European 
2002  2804  Vendex KBB Nederland   Brico Belgium S.A.  7  1  Service  Intra-European 
 
                                                 
 